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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, 
BROOKES COLBY SHUMWAY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20001100 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant Brookes Shumway is appealing his conviction for murder on the basis 
that the instructions to the jury concerning manslaughter were erroneous. The unlawful 
instructions prevented the jury from considering that lesser offense as a basis for the 
conviction in this case. Brookes is entitled to a new trial with proper instructions. 
In response to Brookes's first issue on appeal, the state admits the manslaughter 
instructions violated Utah law and deprived Brookes of the opportunity to have the jury 
consider that offense as a basis for the conviction. Notwithstanding the state's admis-
sions, the state asserts that Brookes is not entitled to a new trial. According to the state, 
the error was harmless. The state is incorrect as set forth below. See infra Point I, below. 
Brookes also is challenging on appeal the sufficiency of the state's evidence as it 
relates to the conviction for tampering. Brookes maintains that the state's inability to 
locate (and its unwillingness to continue any investigation into the whereabouts of) an 
implement that apparently was used in the stabbing is insufficient to support that Brookes 
f,alter[ed], destroyed], concealed], or remove[d]lf the implement. Even if this 
Court were to string together the facts and inferences identified by the state as supporting 
the matter, they are too speculative to uphold the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For the reasons set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, and as more fully set forth 
below, Brookes respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction for tampering 
and remand the case for dismissal of that charge. See infra. Point II, below. 
POINT I. THE STATE ADMITS THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
LEGAL ERROR IN THIS CASE, BUT CLAIMS THE ERROR WAS 
HARMLESS. THE STATE IS INCORRECT. THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In January 2000, the state charged 15-year-old Brookes Shumway with murder 
and evidence tampering in connection with the stabbing death of Christopher Ray. (R. 2-
4.) After juvenile certification proceedings, the district court proceeded to trial, and 
Brookes was convicted by a jury as charged. (R. 64-66; 296:727-29; 120-21; 123.) 
On appeal, Brookes maintains that the trial court provided unlawful instructions to 
the jury on the lesser offense of manslaughter. (See Brief of Appellant dated August 28, 
2001, at Point I.) Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury both in writing and orally 
that before it could consider the lesser offense of manslaughter as an alternative basis for 
the conviction, it must first acquit Brookes of murder. The instructions were incorrect in 
two respects: First, this Court has ruled that a trial court is prohibited from mandating a 
specific order of deliberation to the jury between murder and manslaughter. State v. 
Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 869-70 (Utah 1998); State v. Powell 872 P.2d 1027, 1031-
32 (Utah 1994). Thus, the instructions were in blatant violation of the law. 
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Second, the instructions were incorrect where the manslaughter alternatives here 
were consistent with an intentional killing. That is, the instructions ordered the jury first 
to acquit on the charge of murder before it could consider manslaughter (R. 831-33; 
296:664-65), while the law permitted the jury to find the elements of intentional murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt plus an additional element of extreme emotional distress or an 
imperfect legal justification for manslaughter. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3) (1999); 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 751, 753-54, 755 (Utah 1986); Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d at 
870, n. 6.1 The instructions were improper. 
1
 In its brief, the state does not dispute the elements of manslaughter under either the 
extreme-emotional-distress or the imperfect-legal-justification alternative. Indeed, this 
Court has recognized that even if a jury finds defendant guilty of intentional murder, it 
still may consider extreme-emotional-distress and/or imperfect-legal-justification man-
slaughter for the intentional killing. See Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 869-70 & n. 6; see 
State v. Norman. 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978); 2 W. LaFave & A.Scott, Substantive 
Crim. Law § 7.10 at 253 (1986) (intent to kill is an element of voluntary manslaughter). 
In that regard, the lesser offense of manslaughter under those alternative theories 
presents a unique situation. Specifically, where this Court traditionally would assess 
whether a basis existed in the evidence to support an acquittal on the greater offense and 
conviction on the lesser offense, see State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983), that 
traditional analysis does not lend itself to application here. In the context of this case, "it 
[is] theoretically possible that the jury could [find] that every necessary element for 
murder [has] been satisfied and yet that manslaughter [is] the crime committed if the jury 
[finds] that the killing was committed 'under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.5" See Piansiaksone. 
954 P.2d at 870; see also Norman. 580 P.2d at 240. 
Stated another way, the traditional "acquittal first" standard identified in the state's 
brief is unworkable in this context. (See State's Brief at 10-11 n.3.) A defendant may be 
convicted of extreme-emotional-distress or imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter 
even if he admits to all elements of an intentional killing. See Cloud. 722 P.2d at 754-55. 
The forms of manslaughter at issue here mitigate an intentional murder. 
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Also, since trial counsel failed to object to the unlawful language in the 
instructions, Brookes asked this Court to review the matter for plain error, ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and/or manifest injustice. (See Brief of Appellant Point I.D.) The 
state does not take serious issue with that request.2 
Indeed, in response to Brookes's first issue on appeal, the state has acknowledged 
2
 The state asserts in a footnote that the plain error analysis fails because Brookes's 
trial counsel, Randall Lund, "agreed to the instructions as given." (State's Brief at 10, 
n.2.) The state is mistaken. During a bench hearing outside the presence of the jury, the 
judge informed the parties that he would instruct the jury on the lesser offense of 
manslaughter. (R. 296:662.) The judge also asked the parties if they would like the 
benefit of the record to preserve any objections. (R. 296:662.) Counsel for Brookes 
stated, "No, your Honor." (R. 296:663.) That was appropriate. The defense did not have 
an objection then, or now, to instructing the jury on the offense of manslaughter. 
On the other hand, there is no indication in the record that the parties were advised 
at the bench hearing that the judge intended to misstate the law in providing the 
manslaughter instructions, or that he intended to mandate the order of deliberation in 
violation of the law. Indeed, the record reflects that counsel did not have a copy of the 
instructions until sometime later. (R. 296:663 (judge subsequently endeavored to "provide 
copies of the Jury Instructions to both counsel").) Thus, while counsel agreed that the jury 
should be instructed on manslaughter, there is nothing to support that counsel agreed to 
the erroneous language in the instructions. 
Thereafter, in counsel's presence, the judge read the instructions to the jury. (R. 
296:663-64.) The written and oral instructions were erroneous. (R. 831; 832-33; 
296:664-65.) Counsel failed to object. (Id.) Since counsel did not actively, affirmatively 
agree to the improper language of the instructions, his failure to object required Brookes 
to argue plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and manifest injustice on appeal. 
With respect to the state's reliance on State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, p 1, 12 
P.3d 92, that case is distinguishable. (See State's Brief at 10, n.2.) There, defense 
counsel specifically and affirmatively represented on the record that he was satisfied with 
jurors, who had personal information regarding the victim and/or defendant, thereby 
foreclosing review of the issue on appeal. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, Tfl[4-6, 31. In 
Brookes's case, Randall Lund was passive when he failed to object to the improper 
language as the trial judge instructed the jury. (See R. 296:663-64.) This Court may 
review the issue on appeal under any of the doctrines identified above. 
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legal error. The state admits the instructions deprived Brookes of the opportunity to have 
the jury consider the lesser offense of manslaughter as an alternative basis for the convic-
tion, and the instructions improperly mandated the order of deliberation in the case. (See 
State's Brief at 8, 10, and 11); Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d at 869; Powell, 872 P.2d at 1031. 
Notwithstanding the concessions, the state claims Brookes is not entitled to a new 
trial. According to the state, the legal error was harmless where "defendant was not even 
entitled" to an instruction on manslaughter in the first place. (State's Brief at 12.) 
The state is incorrect. In fact, the trial judge, who presided over the trial and 
observed the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified, found the state's argument to be 
unpersuasive. (R. 296:662-63.) The trial judge found that the evidence presented 
sufficient questions and alternative interpretations to support an instruction on 
manslaughter. (Id.) 
This Court should agree with the trial court on that point. After all, the trial judge 
was uniquely and objectively situated to observe the deportment and persuasiveness of the 
evidence and to derive a sense of the proceedings as a whole, an opportunity not afforded 
on appeal with a cold record. The evidence supports instructing the jury on 
manslaughter. 
Also, the state's "harmlessness" argument disregards the proper prejudice analysis. 
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When this Court considers the prejudice resulting from legal error, ' it focuses on the taint 
caused by the error." State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). 
Where the "taint" is caused by an unlawful instruction, this Court specifically will 
not assess whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and it will not 
"weigh the credibility of the evidence, a function reserved for the trier of fact." Baker, 
671 P.2d at 159. Rather, this Court will decide whether there is "some evidence" in the 
record (Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871) to justify a proper instruction on the lesser offense, 
"a decision which must be made concerning all jury instructions in any trial." Baker, 671 
P.2datl59. 
In Baker, this Court specified that if the evidence is such that alternative inferen-
ces "may legitimately be made" to support the lesser offense, this Court will remand the 
case to allow a jury to assess and interpret the evidence in light of the proper lesser 
offense instruction. Id. That approach preserves the function of the jury as the finder of 
fact; it allows the jury to weigh and interpret the evidence. Id. 
Any other approach to the matter would deprive the defendant of the right to have 
the jury interpret and decide the facts. See State v. Law, 147 P.2d 324, 327 (Utah 1944) 
(whether defendant was justified in his conduct, whether he had reasonable ground to 
believe that adversary was about to take his life or to do him great bodily harm, whether 
he felt need to resort to deadly force, whether he used unnecessary force on his adversary, 
whether he or adversary brought on the encounter are questions for the jury); State v. 
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Turner, 79 P.2d 46, 52 (Utah 1938) (whether adversary provoked defendant or was 
sufficiently menacing to cause defendant to believe deadly force was necessary was a jury 
question); State v. Knoll 712 P.2d 211,215-16 (Utah 1985) Qury will determine whether 
defendant's use of force was reasonable and necessary under the circumstances). 
In short, this Court must remand the matter for a new trial if any interpretation of 
the evidence would support a proper manslaughter instruction. See Piansiaksone, 954 
P.2d at 871 (court considers "indirect evidence in the record" in the light "most favor-
able" to a determination as to whether "defendant acted under extreme emotional dis-
turbance"); also Baker, 671 P.2d at 159; State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). 
"The requirement is more than a procedural nicety; it is rooted in defendant's 
constitutional right to a jury trial." State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). 
"[J]uries should not be precluded from determining how criminal conduct should be 
characterized and judged. In all events, a defendant has an absolute right to have the jury 
instructed on a lesser crime, as long as there is some evidence to support it." Id. at 267. 
Also, the state's argument against the manslaughter instructions in this case seems 
to blur the distinction between the alternative forms of manslaughter at issue here (ex-
treme-emotional-distress and imperfect-legal-justification), and justifiable self-defense. 
(State's Brief, Point I.) Those concepts are distinguishable, as further discussed below. 
A. THE EXTREME-EMOTIONAL-DISTRESS FORM OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
The manslaughter alternatives at issue here reduce murder to manslaughter if the 
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defendant intentionally caused the death of another (Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 870) 
"under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable expla-
nation or excuse;11 or "under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or 
excusable under the existing circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3) (1999). 
"The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (3)(a)(i) or the 
reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (3)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances." Id at (3)(c). 
This Court ruled in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), overruled on other 
grounds. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), that the Utah manslaughter statute 
contains an objective standard and is grounded in the principles of mitigation. Bishop, 
753 P.2d at 469. This Court explained that under Utah's statute, a person suffers from an 
extreme emotional disturbance/distress under the following circumstances: 
(1) when he has no mental illness as defined in section 76-2-305 (insanity or 
diminished capacity); and 
(2) when he is exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress; and 
(3) when the average reasonable person under that stress would have an extreme 
emotional reaction to it, as a result of which he would experience a loss of 
self-control and that person's reason would be overborne by intense feelings, such 
as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions. 
Id at 471. The standard contemplates a triggering or provocative circumstance that 
would cause a reasonable person to experience intense feelings. 
Also, the above manslaughter standard recognizes that the defendant's conduct — 
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which was preceded by an event that would cause a reasonable person to experience 
rage, anger, etc. - constitutes a crime in that the defendant's response was "clearly-
wrong" (State's Brief at 14) or unreasonably aggressive. Stated another way, if (i) the 
circumstances precipitating the event are such that a reasonable person would experience 
intense feelings, thereby satisfying the requirement for a "reasonable[]" "explanation or 
excuse" from the "viewpoint of a reasonable person" (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a) 
and (3)(c)), but (ii) the defendant disregarded the normal standard of care in reacting to 
those feelings, his conduct would not be justified. It would constitute manslaughter.3 
This Court ruled in Standiford that in order for a defendant's reaction to constitute 
manslaughter, his conduct "must be 'a gross deviation' from the standard of care 
exercised by an ordinary person." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. Thus, self-defense may 
be distinguished from manslaughter in the amount of force used by defendant and 
whether he was justified in using that force.4 
3
 On the other hand, if (i) the circumstances precipitating the event would cause the 
reasonable person to experience intense feelings, and (ii) the deadly force used by the 
defendant was commensurate with the threat he faced, the defendant would be justified 
in his conduct and it would constitute self-defense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999) 
4
 The plain language of Section 76-5-203(3)(c) concerning the "reasonable person" 
and "reasonableness of an explanation or excuse" does not require the jury to assess 
whether the defendant used reasonable force. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 472 (manslaughter 
does not require the jury to find that "the defendant's acts of killing were reasonable," 
but rather, that the emotional disturbance had "a reasonable explanation or cause"); 
also compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(c) (1999) (discussing "reasonableness of 
the explanation or excuse" from the "viewpoint" of a "reasonable person") with Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999) (defining when use of deadly "force" is 
9 
Next, case law supports that if the victim's actions caused the defendant to suffer 
a traumatic or violent event or injury, or the victim's conduct caused the defendant's 
anger, those circumstances would serve to mitigate an intentional killing to 
manslaughter. See Norman, 580 P.2d at 240 (recognizing that intentional killing would 
constitute manslaughter if defendant's anger was caused by victim); People v. Harris, 
134 N.E.2d 315, 317 (111. 1956) (recognizing that humans react violently to an attack). 
Since the average person would have a stressful reaction to being attacked by a 
person with a knife, that circumstance constitutes a "reasonable[]" "explanation or 
excuse" for the emotional distress. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(c). Thereafter, if the 
defendant's reaction to the attack is a "gross deviation" from the ordinary standard of 
care, the defendant's conduct constitutes manslaughter. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267; 
see also 2 W. LaFave & A.Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.10(a) (1986). 
With that background, the state seems to claim that no interpretation of the 
evidence here would support the extreme-emotional-distress form of manslaughter. Yet, 
the facts support the precipitating event, which would give rise to extreme emotional 
distress. According to the undisputed facts of record, law enforcement officers and those 
"reasonable]"). If the circumstances would cause the reasonable person to feel distress, 
anger, rage, the jury may consider manslaughter as an alternative basis for the conviction 
where defendant's conduct was "clearly wrong" (State's Brief at 14) and he used 
unreasonable and deadly force. 
Significantly, if the "reasonableness" language set forth in § 76-5-203(3)(c) went 
to the amount of force the defendant used, the statutory interpretation would erode the 
difference between self-defense and manslaughter. 
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who knew Brookes described him as peaceful and cooperative; there is nothing to suggest 
he was generally a violent or aggressive boy. (R. 295:645, 627; 293:235.) 
Next, the evidence supported that Brookes did not bring about the particular dis-
turbance by his own conduct or mental illness. According to the evidence, Brookes spent 
the night with Christopher. (See R. 293:147-50.) In the early morning hours, Christo-
pher, who was described as a hothead and violent (R. 295:639-43), went to the kitchen 
and retrieved a knife. He began to throw it in the air and catch it. (R. 294:500, 295:557.) 
Christopher then lunged at Brookes with the knife and began poking him. (R. 294: 
500; 295:557.) Brookes became angry and upset. As a result, "he stabbed [Christopher] 
and he wasn't sure how many more times." (R. 294:508-509.) 
At least one interpretation of the evidence supports that Christopher brought about 
the disturbance. The evidence supports that Christopher initiated a violent and traumatic 
act by attacking Brookes with the knife. A reasonable person would experience stress, 
anger, great agitation and rage if a friend lunged at him with a knife and began to poke 
him. Christopher's violent, aggressive conduct provided a reasonable excuse or 
explanation for Brookes's stress and rage. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203(3)(c) (1999); see 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871 (where there was "no hint that [Piansiaksone] was upset," 
the record lacked evidence to support extreme-emotional-distress instruction). 
Brookes's rage may be explained under the reasonable person standard. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(c) (1999). In addition, a jury may have considered his reaction 
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to Christopher to be '"a gross deviation' from the standard of care exercised by an 
ordinary person," Standi ford, 769 P.2d at 267, thereby providing a basis for the 
manslaughter conviction. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 472 (for manslaughter, the jury is not 
required to find that defendant acted reasonably in killing the victim). 
Specifically, as set forth in the state's brief, the evidence supports that Brookes 
allegedly reacted by stabbing Christopher in the throat and chest. According to the 
medical examiner, "the lethal wound to the victim's throat was inflicted early in the 
struggle, while the victim's blood pressure was still good" (State's Brief at 16), and while 
Brookes may have perceived the victim to be most threatening. After the two potentially 
fatal injuries were inflicted, the evidence supports that the remaining wounds were not as 
deadly (R. 293:272-73 (wound to diaphragm was serious but not deadly)), and in some 
cases, they were superficial. (See R. 293:268, 270-74.) 
At the end of the encounter, Brookes went to the bedroom to wake Deborah Robb. 
He told her twice that Christopher tried to stab him. (R. 293:151 -52.) When Deborah 
reached Christopher, the evidence supports he may have been alive. (See R. 293:252.) 
Throughout the remainder of the morning, Brookes assisted Deborah in her efforts 
to resuscitate Christopher, he was peaceful, and he was sobbing. (R. 293:154-55, 235; 
295:627.) According to the officers who responded to the scene, Brookes was not 
violent, or a danger, and those involved in investigating the matter described him as 
cooperative and non-threatening. 
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A reasonable interpretation of the evidence supports the manslaughter alternative. 
See Standiford, 769 P.2d at 264, 266 (the victim was stabbed 107 times', this Court 
approved of the instructions for manslaughter and self defense that were provided to the 
jury to support defendant's theory of the case); Cloud, 722 P.2d at 751, 753-55 (victim 
stabbed 27 times and died of multiple u critical wounds "; defendant would be entitled to 
proper instructions on extreme-emotional-distress at new trial); KnolL 712 P.2d at 211 
(defendant convicted of manslaughter where victim died of multiple stab wounds). 
The facts support Brookes's reputation as a gentle person, who may have used 
unlawful and excessive force against an aggressive and threatening friend with a knife. 
The record contains numerous references to Christopher's aggressive and provoking 
conduct on and prior to January 23. (R. 294:500; 295:557, 639-43.) The state did not 
offer any evidence to contradict that depiction. The initiating circumstances would cause 
any reasonable person to experience distress, anger and great agitation.5 Thereafter, 
5
 In the opening brief, appellant also cited to evidence that Brookes suffered teasing 
and humiliation from peers since third grade and "it all came out" on Christopher. (Brief 
of Appellant, 24.) That evidence may be relevant to the manslaughter alternatives. (R. 
293:129 (prosecutor acknowledged Brookes's history of abuse)); State v. Magnen 732 
A.2d 234, 242-43 (Del. 1997) (history of abuse suffered by defendant may support ex-
treme emotional disturbance); State v. Hovt 128 N.W.2d 645, 648-49 (Wis 1964) (abu-
sive background and recent provocative conduct by victim would support manslaughter). 
Significantly, that evidence does not suggest that Brookes suffered a "mental 
illness" or that the events in this case arose as a result of a "mental illness." Under Utah 
law, evidence of a "mental illness," i.e. insanity or diminished capacity, may not be 
considered under the extreme-emotional distress analysis. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(3)(b)(i). 
Even if the jury disregarded the evidence of Brookes's abusive history, the uncon-
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Brookes's alleged reaction to the incident reflected a "gross deviation from the ordinary 
standard of care," i.e. manslaughter. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. 
This Court should reverse the conviction in this case and order a new trial in order 
that the jury may be able to consider the evidence with the appropriate, lawful choices. 
B. THE IMPERFECT-LEGAL-JUSTIFICATION FORM OF 
MANSLAUGHTER. 
As for the imperfect-legal-justification form of manslaughter, case law in this State 
supports that the jury may consider that lesser offense under the following circumstances: 
if the defendant did not initiate the difficulty but honestly and wrongly believed that he 
was in danger of injury or death; or if the defendant brought about the difficulty and 
reasonably believed he must defend himself with deadly force. See Turner, 79 P.2d at 48 
(defendant was the aggressor and the only party to arm himself with a knife and a gun; 
defendant was convicted of manslaughter); State v. Howell 649 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 1982) 
(defendant and third person were engaged in an altercation at a party; defendant left to 
retrieve a gun; when he returned, he engaged in a scuffle with the victim, killing him and 
wounding another; defendant was convicted of manslaughter and attempted 
manslaughter); State v. Coonce. 2001 UT App 355,1J10, 36 P.3d 533; Utah Code Ann. § 
tested facts and inferences in this case support extreme emotional distress for the man-
slaughter instruction, where Christopher was an aggressive, violent person (R. 295:639-
43), who provoked Brookes and initiated the altercation when he lunged at Brookes with 
a knife. Under the proper standard, a reasonable person would experience anger and 
intense feelings toward Christopher for his violent and aggressive conduct. 
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75-5-203(3)(a)(ii) (1999); see also supra. Point LA., herein. 
The state claims the evidence fails to support "defendant's contention that Chris-
topher was the aggressor" for the imperfect-legal-justification form of manslaughter. 
(State's Brief at 16.) That statement should be disregarded for several reasons. 
First, that statement is contrary to assertions made by the prosecutor at trial. The 
prosecutor stated to the judge that she felt "the defendant has run a perfect self-defense, 
claiming justification in this case." (R. 296:662.) By that statement, the prosecutor 
admitted that an interpretation of the evidence supported that Christopher initiated the 
encounter and was the aggressor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) and (2)(a) 
("justification" for "self defense" exists if defendant was not the aggressor). Such 
evidence likewise supported the imperfect-legal-justification form of manslaughter. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(ii) and (c) (1999); Turner, 79 P.2d at 52 (whether 
the victim provoked defendant and caused him to believe that deadly force was necessary 
was a jury question that went to manslaughter). 
Second, the state has failed to explain its claim that the evidence did not support 
"that Christopher was the aggressor." (State's Brief at 16.) Instead, the state has focused 
on the wounds suffered by Christopher. (Id.) That is irrelevant to this analysis. 
Even if a defendant has conceded that he committed an intentional killing, Cloud, 
722 P.2d at 753, and even if the medical examiner has "testified in detail regarding the 
condition of the body, including the location of each of the 27 stab wounds, their depth, 
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and the force with which they were inflicted," id. at 753-54, the defendant still may be 
entitled to proper manslaughter instructions. Id. at 755; Turner. 79 P.2d at 46; Howell 
649 P.2d at 93; see supra notes 3 and 4, herein. 
In this case, the manslaughter instruction was proper because the evidence 
supported that Christopher was the aggressor. Under the circumstances, the average 
person would reasonably believe that he was justified in defending himself. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(ii) and (c) (1999). Also, the facts give rise to the 
manslaughter instruction where the defendant may not have been justified in using the 
deadly force inflicted here, as represented by the evidence of the wounds. See id. (the 
imperfect-legal-justification form of manslaughter applies where the defendant is not 
legally justified in his use of deadly force); see also supra note 4, herein.6 
6
 The state seems to claim on appeal that although one interpretation of the evidence 
supports that Christopher provoked Brookes (see State's Brief at 15 (recognizing that 
Christopher was toying with a knife and subsequently began poking it at Brookes)), 
Brookes was not entitled to proper manslaughter instructions because another interpreta-
tion supports that Christopher was lying down when he was stabbed, Christopher was 
fatally stabbed early in the struggle, and Christopher's mother and sister were not awa-
kened during the struggle. (See State's Brief at 16-17.) The state's claims are irrelevant. 
Under the proper standard of review, Brookes is entitled to the proper manslaughter 
instructions if "some evidence" exists to support the lesser offense. The evidence of 
Christopher's provocative, aggressive, violent conduct supports the instruction. 
In addition, the state's interpretation of the evidence is inconsequential since the 
facts identified by the state are not inconsistent with the mansalughter alternative. That 
is, if the jury believed Christopher provoked Brookes by poking him with a knife, that 
evidence supports the imperfect legal justification. Indeed, the jury may believe that after 
Christopher provoked Brookes, Christopher was lying on his back when he was fatally 
wounded, and the fatal wound was inflicted early when Brookes perceived 
(continued . . .) 
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Also, in considering the evidence of the wounds, the medical examiner testified 
that the fatal wounds were "inflicted early in the struggle" (State's Brief at 16), apparent-
ly while Brookes perceived Christopher to be a threat. Thereafter, the remaining injuries 
were not life threatening and in some instances were superficial. The evidence reflects 
that as the threat diminished the injuries inflicted were less severe, further dispelling the 
notion that Brookes's alleged attack was premeditated. 
Third, the state failed to present any evidence at trial to refute that Christopher was 
the aggressor. Significantly, Officer Stephens, who was involved in investigating the 
circumstances of this case, told the jury that he asked Brookes how the altercation began. 
When Brookes told him that Christopher lunged at him with the knife, Officer Stephens 
did not question that information. (See R. 294:505.) He only questioned whether Chris-
topher's stab wounds were accidental and self-inflicted or inflicted by Brookes. (Id.) 
Assuming arguendo the jury considered Stephens to be reasonable in his investigation and 
interpretation of the evidence, the jury would have a basis for finding that Christopher 
was the aggressor, and that Brookes's reaction and use of deadly force was a "gross 
deviation" from the reasonable standard of care. See Standiford. 769 P.2d at 267. That 
interpretation of the evidence supports manslaughter. 
Finally, there is no evidence in the record to support that Brookes was a violent 
Christopher to be a threat. Also, Deborah and Jennifer did not awake during the struggle. 
The facts support the instruction; under the manslaughter alternative, the jury is not 
required to find that "the act[] of killing [was] reasonable." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 472. 
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person predisposed to murder or that he had aggressive tendencies. After the attack, 
Brookes did not run away. He went to Deborah's room and told her what happened, then 
he surrendered to authorities and to his emotions. The facts in this case make sense only 
in light of the manslaughter alternatives, where Christopher Ray initiated the attack with 
the knife and began poking Brookes. Thereafter, Brookes overpowered Christopher and 
inflicted the most serious wounds while Christopher was a threat. 
The jury should have been properly instructed on manslaughter. That alternative 
would ensure that Brookes would be held accountable for an unlawful killing, but with 
the proper perspective on the matter. This case should be remanded for a new trial. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE IDENTIFIED BY THE STATE TO SUPPORT 
TAMPERING IS SPECULATIVE, AND THEREFORE. INSUFFICIENT. 
The jury convicted Brookes of tampering with evidence, where officers failed to 
discover an unknown implement allegedly used in the stabbing. Brookes maintains the 
evidence is insufficient to support that conviction. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.) On 
appeal, the state disagrees. (State's Brief, Point II.) Specifically, the state focuses on the 
following to support its claim for evidence tampering. 
First, the state points to evidence that the butcher knife found next to Christopher 
was not used to inflict some of the wounds, including the "fatal cut" to the victim's 
carotid artery. (State's Brief at 20.) 
The state does not explain how that evidence supports the determination that 
Brookes f,[a]lter[ed], destroyed], conceal[ed], or remove[d] anything with a purpose to 
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impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-510(1) (1999). Indeed, the only evidence relating to the unknown implement supports 
that officers made no effort to locate it. On January 23, 2000, officers arrived at the scene 
of the stabbing and conducted an investigation. (See Brief of Appellant at pp. 6-8, and 
45-47 (evidence marshaled in favor of investigative efforts).) Each officer testified to his 
involvement in the matter. On January 24, the medical examiner informed officers that 
an unknown implement allegedly was used in the altercation. (R. 294:387 (Nelson 
learned about second implement on January 24, and was surprised).) 
Significantly, there is no evidence to support that officers made any effort to 
locate the unknown implement. After officers learned about the implement on January 
24, there is no evidence that they contacted Deborah Robb, or any person who had access 
to the trailer or an association with "Crime Scene Cleaners," a company that cleaned the 
trailer on January 23. In addition, there is no evidence to support that when officers were 
at the scene on January 23 they investigated behind, underneath, or inside furniture in the 
living room where an implement may have fallen during the altercation. (See Brief of 
Appellant at 47; State's Brief, Point II, in general (state does not dispute that officers 
failed to investigate under, behind or in furniture in the living room where an implement 
may have dropped).) 
Further, Officer Nelson, who was involved in investigating the trailer home, had 
"no idea" whether a second implement was ever located by officers (R. 294:388), and he 
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did not make any attempt to go back to the trailer to locate a "second implement." (R. 
294:389-91.) Thus, the evidence does not support the conviction against Brookes. 
Second, the state points to evidence that Brookes claimed the altercation took 
place at 5:30 a.m. and he went to wake Deborah at 7:00 a.m. According to the state, "No 
testimony documented what happened during the hour or more between the end of the 
fight and 7 a.m." (State's Brief at 21.) A void in evidence does not support an element 
of the crime. See Krauss v. UDOT. 852 P.2d 1014, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding 
that if the jury disregarded the only evidence on the matter disputing a legal element, the 
lack of evidence does not support the element), overruled on other grounds. Child v. 
Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 11 n.4 (Utah 1995). 
Third, the state points to evidence that Brookes, Christopher, Deborah and Jen-
nifer were the only persons in the trailer at the time of the stabbing. (State's Brief at 21.) 
Those facts add nothing to the matter. By the time the officers learned that an 
unknown implement was used in the stabbing, several other people had been in and out 
of the trailer, moving and removing objects from the living room, including paramedics, 
officers, and members of "Crime Scene Cleaners." (See 294:353-55 (Nelson collected 
and removed items from the trailer); R. 293:180 (Crime Scene Cleaners was called to the 
trailer on January 23).) If the unknown instrument had fallen behind a piece of furniture 
in the living room, it likely was removed by "Crime Scene Cleaners." (See Brief of 
Appellant, at 46-48.) 
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Fourth, the state points to evidence that officers found blankets with slash marks 
and blood stains on the floor in the living room. A witness from the state crime lab 
testified that the blankets looked like they had been bundled up and set aside. (State's 
Brief at 21-22.) Police also found bloody socks in a gym bag. (State's Brief at 22.) 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, those facts do not support that 
Brookes tampered with an unknown implement. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.B.) A state 
witness was unable to say whether the slash marks and blood stains were related to the 
events of January 23 or were even caused by the unknown implement. (R. 294:452.) In 
addition, the leap from the blankets and socks to the unknown implement is too 
speculative and tenuous to constitute a reasonable inference in the matter. Stated another 
way, there is no nexus between the blankets in the living room (where the altercation took 
place), the gym socks in the bag (which may have been there for months, .see R. 294:452), 
and the "second implement" (which most likely remained in the living room due to 
oversight in the investigation). (See Brief of Appellant at 48-49.) 
Fifth, the state claims that an entry in Brookes's journal several months after the 
stabbing supports tampering. In the entry, Brookes wrote, "Do they know what kind of 
knife is the other?" (State's Brief at 22.) As set forth in the opening brief, those facts 
support that Brookes was hopeful that officers were able to locate the unknown 
implement since that would clear him of wrong doing. That entry does not support that 
Brookes had any information about the matter or that he "[a]lter[ed], destroy [ed], 
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concealed], or remove[d] anything with a purpose to impair its verity or availability in 
the proceeding or investigation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1999). 
This case is similar in relevant respects to State v. Wooden. 619 N.E.2d 1132 
(Ohio App. 1993). There, officers responded to a call of shots fired from a Cadillac with 
Alabama license plates. Id. at 1133. When the officers stopped the Cadillac, a man 
exited from the back passenger seat and took off running with an officer in pursuit. 
Remaining officers stayed at the scene. As they approached the car, a shot was fired from 
the Cadillac as the driver maneuvered the car around the officers and drove away. The 
officers got into their patrol cars and chased the Cadillac until it ran into a curb and the 
occupants fled. Id. at 1133. The next day, the officers arrested the driver of the car at an 
area hospital, and witnesses identified the defendant as the person who fired the shots. Id. 
The officers recovered a gun under the front passenger seat of the Cadillac, and 
submitted it along with an officer's gun to the state crime lab for ballistics tests. When 
the tests showed that the shots were not fired from either gun, the state charged defendant 
with evidence tampering. Defendant was convicted and he appealed. The Ohio Court of 
Appeals ruled the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Id at 1134. 
The evidence regarding the whereabouts of the gun at issue is minimal. At 
least three guns were involved in this incident, but only two were recovered-
Officer Reilly's gun and a gun under the front passenger seat of the vehicle. While 
there was sufficient evidence that appellant fired the initial shot, ballistics tests 
showed that this shot was not fired from either of the guns recovered. Two 
officers testified that appellant had a gun during the initial stop of the vehicle. 
The area surrounding the vehicle was searched after the suspects fled. 
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Additionally, two residences were searched. There is no evidence that either of 
these residences was that of the appellant. 
While the third gun was not recovered, this evidence is not sufficient to 
show that the appellant "altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed11 it. Many 
possibilities as to the whereabouts of the gun can be imagined, including the 
possibility that one of the other two suspects fled the scene with it in his 
possession. In any case, the fact that the police looked a few places for the gun 
and could not find it does not necessarily show that the appellant tampered with it. 
Id. at 1134. The appellate court reversed the tampering conviction. 
In the context of this case, apparently one or two implements were involved in the 
stabbing incident, one of which was not recovered. While the evidence may support that 
Brookes inflicted the wounds, the medical examiner's report showed that some of the 
wounds were not inflicted with the butcher knife that was recovered. (R. 293:284.) 
Several officers testified they were involved in an investigation of the scene. None 
of the officers testified they engaged in a search in, under or behind furniture where an 
implement may have dropped during an altercation (see Brief of Appellant at 47; State's 
Brief in general (state does not dispute that evidence failed to support that officers looked 
in, under or behind living room furniture)); and none of the officers testified they made 
any effort to return to the scene or to contact any individuals who may have had 
information about the implement, once they learned of its existence. 
Also, when Officer Nelson was asked if officers located the second implement, he 
could not say one way or another, and he could not say whether any follow-up investiga-
tion occurred. (See R. 294:388-89.) 
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Although the whereabouts of the second implement is unknown, the "evidence is 
not sufficient to show that the appellant 'altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed' it. 
Many possibilities as to the whereabouts of the [weapon] can be imagined," Wooden, 619 
N.E.2d at 1134, including the possibility that individuals from "Crime Scene Cleaners" 
removed it while cleaning the trailer. 
"In any case, the fact that the police looked a few places" "does not necessarily 
show that the appellant tampered with [the weapon]." Id. The evidence is insufficient to 
support the conviction. See also People v. Raffaele, 582 N.Y.S.2d 779 (App. Div. 2d 
Dept. 1992) (defendant was convicted of public records tampering where evidence 
showed that items in a hotel room were missing and defendant had access to the room; 
however, since defendant was not the only person who entered the room before the items 
were discovered missing, evidence was insufficient to support tampering). 
In this case, the state presented no evidence to support that Brookes altered, de-
stroyed, concealed, or removed the unknown implement. Rather, the more likely scenario 
is that officers did not discover the implement because they did not look behind, under or 
in furniture in the living room where the altercation took place, and they did not conduct 
a follow-up investigation after they learned about the implement. 
As set forth herein, and as set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Brookes 
respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing the conviction for tampering. 
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CONCLUSION 
With respect to the conviction for murder, Brookes Shumway respectfully requests 
remand for a new trial. With respect to the conviction for evidence tampering, Brookes 
Shumway requests reversal and remand for dismissal. 
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